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TYRANNICAL REINS OR NECESSARY
RESTRAINTS?
LAWRENCE G. NUSBAUM, HI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative apartments' offer individuals the advantages of home-
ownership2 while freeing them from many of the responsibilities ac-
companying single-family dwellings.3 Due to the close proximity of
dwelling units4 and the financial interdependence5 of tenant-sharehold-
* B.A., Syracuse University, 1983; J.D., Washington University, 1986.
1. A cooperative apartment is defined as a "multi-family dwelling for members of a
cooperative corporation, with each member having a stock interest in the corporation
that owns the building, and by virtue of that stock interest entitled and required to
receive an occupancy agreement with the corporation." TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 3220 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Among the elements of home ownership that a cooperative apartment offers are
the right to sole occupancy; the right to select, and the obligation to pay for, fixtures
and decorations in the units; performance of tenure; a voice in the management and
operation of the premises; and the right to deduct real etate taxes and mortgage interest
payments. See Isaacs, "To Buy or Not to Buy, This is the Question"... What is a
Cooperative Apartment? 13 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 203, 208 (1958).
3. A purchaser of a cooperative interest avoids such responsibilities as the upkeep of
his yard and house. The cooperative usually hires a management group to perform
these duties. Furthermore, building security devices and the presence of other coopera-
tors provide enhanced protection from thieves and vandals.
4. Structurally, cooperative apartments are similar to apartment buildings. Individ-
ual units are typically adjacent to one another.
5. See Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, 256 A.D. 685, 689-92, 11
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ers,6 however, cooperatives act cautiously when admitting new mem-
bers. To protect themselves from potentially disruptive or insolvent
buyers, cooperatives condition the sale of each apartment upon the
consent of a board of directors.7
Individuals denied the right to buy or sell cooperative interests have
challenged the boards' legal power to withhold consent.' All courts
concur that the unique nature of cooperative housing9 necessitates
some screening of potential tenant-shareholders.10 The courts disa-
gree, however, on the extent to which boards lawfully may exercise this
power. A majority of state courts apply a reasonableness standard to
test the legality of board decisions." Conversely, New York courts
allow boards of directors to exercise unlimited'2 discretion in determin-
ing whether to accept or reject a proposed sale. The divergent stan-
dards reflect the conflicting policy concerns among the jurisdictions.
The majority view protects a cooperator's right to liquidate his inter-
N.Y.S.2d 417, 420-23 (App. Div. 1939). A cooperative is financed by a single mortgage
on the building. The corporation's ability to make mortgage payments depends upon
each member meeting his periodic assessments. If one cooperator fails to pay his assess-
ment, the others must pay the defaulter's share to avoid foreclosure. See Note, Federal
Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542, 597
(1958-59).
6. In this Note, the words cooperator and tenant-shareholder are used interchange-
ably to refer to the owner of a cooperative interest. "Tenant-shareholder" is an appro-
priate term because the person who purchases a cooperative interest receives a lease as
well as stock in the corporation. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
7. Tenant-shareholders elect a board of directors. The board is vested with the
power to approve or reject any sale of a cooperator's interest. This power usually is set
out in either the corporation's bylaws or articles of incorporation. If the board con-
cludes that a prospective purchaser will be disruptive to the community or unable to
meet his periodic assessment, it may withhold consent and effectively prevent a tenant-
shareholder from selling his cooperative interest to that prospective tenant. See Note,
Cooperative Apartment Housing, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1407, 1416-18 (1947).
8. See infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
9. Cooperative apartments include features not found in other types of homeowner-
ship. See supra notes 4-5.
10. Without the ability to choose its members, cooperative housing could be elimi-
nated. Because state legislatures have approved the cooperative housing concept, all
courts agree that cooperative housing associations should have the means to screen po-
tential members. The majority and minority views, however, differ over the amount of
discretion the cooperative may exercise in rejecting an applicant. For a detailed com-
parison of the views, see infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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est.13 In contrast, the New York view provides tenant-shareholders
with an unfettered right to select their neighbors.' 4 This position effec-
tively prevents a cooperator from selling his interest if the board deter-
mines that the proposed buyer is unsuitable.
This Note will scrutinize both the majority and the New York posi-
tions and argue that neither adequately protects a tenant-shareholder's
right to sell his cooperative interest. Part II provides an overview of
cooperative apartments and explains why transfer restrictions on coop-
erative interests are necessary. Part III examines the different stan-
dards jurisdictions have adopted to determine the legality of
restrictions. Part IV analyzes the impact that application of these stan-
dards has on cooperatives and on tenant-shareholders attempting to
sell their cooperative interest. Part IV concludes by proposing an alter-
native standard that protects a cooperator's right to sell his interest
without exposing the cooperative to additional risks.
II. THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT
A cooperative apartment house is a multi-unit dwelling in which
each occupant possesses both an interest in the corporation owning the
building and a proprietary lease entitling him to occupy a particular
apartment.' Cooperative housing 6 developed as a result of the grow-
ing demand 7 for desirable city housing, coupled with the rising cost of
13. See infra notes 103 and 142 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
15. See Sanders v. Tropicana, 31 N.C. App. 276, 278, 229 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1976).
For a broader discussion of cooperative apartments' specific features, see infra notes 32-
35 and accompanying text.
16. The roots of modem day cooperative housing can be traced to twelfth century
Germany. See Leyser, The Ownership of Flats-A Comparative Study, 7 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 31, 33 (1958) Early eighteenth century France provides the earliest example of
cooperative housing as it appears today. After a fire destroyed a significant portion of a
city's housing, individuals displaced by the fire purchased floors in multi-level buildings
to provide dwellings for their families. See McCullough, Co-operative Apartments in
Illinois, 26 CHI. [-] KENT L. REV. 303, 304 (1947-48).
Cooperative housing did not spread to the United States until the late nineteenth
century. One of the first American cooperative projects was the Barrington Apartment
Association in New York City. See Isaacs, supra note 2, at 209. See also Gray, The
'Revolution'of 1881 is Now in its 2d Century, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, § 12 (Maga-
zine), at 61.
17. See Bratt, Cooperative Apartments: A Survey of Legal Treatment and an Argu-
ment for Homestead Protection, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 759, 771-72, 785 (1978). The end of
World War II brought about a shortage of urban housing. The wartime interruption of
the housing industry left cities ill-prepared for the post-war mass migration of people
19861
Washington University Open Scholarship
150 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 30:147
residential property.18 Persons financially unable to own single family
city dwellings turned to cooperative apartments, which provided buy-
ers with many features of homeownership at affordable prices. 19 To-
day, however, the price of most cooperatives limits their use almost
exclusively2 ° to upper income families.2
A. The Formation of a Cooperative Housing Corporation
Modern day cooperative projects can be organized in several ways.22
Most commonly, however, they are structured through the use of a
corporate entity.23 A promoter initiates the formation of a cooperative
from rural to urban areas and the influx of returning war veterans. See U.S. DEPT. OF
H.U.D., HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY
REVIEW 10 (1974).
18. For example, in 1940 the average price of a home in an urban area was $2355.
By 1947 the average price had risen to $5260. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1950 720 (71st ed. 1950).
19. See Isaacs, supra note 2, at 297-98. The individual purchased a cooperative
apartment that provided him with a home in the city. Although the purchaser did not
own the entire structure, his purchase gave him the right to inhabit an apartment, at a
fraction of the cost of acquiring the whole building. See supra note 2 (discussing the
home ownership features a cooperative apartment provides).
20. For example, the average price of a cooperative apartment in New York City is
$90,000 per room. This figure is rising. The price per room in 1977 was $20,000. John-
son, Great Expectations Fuel New York Area Market, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, § 12
(Magazine), at 34.
21. This Note deals with "expensive" cooperatives financed by the individual pur-
chaser. For an extensive look at government subsidized cooperatives for the lower and
middle class, see Note, The Cooperative Apartment in Government Assisted Low-Middle
Income Housing, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 638 (1962).
22. See Comment, Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment Property, 13
HASTINGS L.J. 357, 358-59 (1961-62). This Note addresses cooperatives organized as
corporations. There are, however, two other methods used to organize cooperative
housing projects: the "co-ownership method" and the "trust method." Under the co-
ownership method, tenants own the building as co-owners in fee simple, with each
owner having the exclusive right to occupy an apartment. Co-ownership is accom-
plished by the use of joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or the California tenancy in
common type of ownership. Under the "trust" method, a group of individuals estab-
lishes an express trust and transfers title to the building into the trust. A trustee then
either hires management or manages the project himself. The trust declaration contains
provisions establishing the tenants rights and cooperative project's rules and regula-
tions. See 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.01[1]-[3], at 2-7 (1984).
23. See McCullough, supra note 16, at 309. For an in depth discussion of why
corporate cooperatives are favored over other methods of organization, see Yourman,
Some Legal Aspects of Cooperative Housing, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 126, 127-29
(1947). See also P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 2.01, at 2-8.
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housing venture.2 4 The promoter usually is an entreprenuer who has
decided2" to construct an apartment building or reorganize the owner-
ship features of an existing structure. 26 The corporate entity holds title
to the land and building, and is liable on the mortgage.2 7 Because
states have not enacted legislation governing the formation process,
2 8
cooperatives generally use the corporate structure to achieve joint own-
ership between cooperators. 29 Depending on the state, incorporation
occurs under either cooperative 30 or general corporate 31 statutes. All
states, however, require three legal documents to effectuate a coopera-
tive apartment corporation. These documents are: (1) a corporate
charter;32 (2) a set of corporate bylaws; 33 and (3) a proprietary lease34
or occupancy agreement. Collectively, these documents set forth both
24. See 15a AM. JUR. 2d Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments § 71 (1964).
Promoters are defined as "the person who, for themselves or others, take the prelimi-
nary steps towards the organization of a corporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1092 (5th ed. 1979).
25. A promoter may choose to organize a cooperative for a number of reasons.
First, if he owns a rental building he may determine he will receive a larger profit by
selling the units rather than collecting rent. This usually is the motivating factor in
areas having "rent control" laws. For a discussion of rent control, see B. BAIRD, RENT
CONTROL: THE PERENNIAL FOLLY (1960). Second, the promoter may purchase a
building and renovate the structure. Then, by converting the building into cooperative
apartments, the promoter can receive a substantial return on his investment. For a
detailed discussion of the conversion process, see P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note
22, § 22.01, at 6. Finally, the promoter owning a rental building may no longer want
landlord responsibilities.
26. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 772.
27. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
28. See P. KEHOE, COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMs 21 (1974). The coopera-
tive formation process, unlike condominium formation, has been left untouched by state
legislatures. The various techniques utilized in cooperative formation draw on state
trust, property and corporate laws. For an example of state condominium legislation,
see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718, 104 (West 1983).
29. Purchasers receive shares of stock in the cooperative corporation, thus becom-
ing tenant-shareholders, co-owners of the apartment building. See supra note 22.
30. Some states have enacted legislation specifically providing for cooperative incor-
poration. See, e.g., N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 13 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
31 In states that do not have separate cooperative corporation statutes, coopera-
tives incorporated under general business corporate statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 300 (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1985).
32. The corporate charter represents a "contract between the corporation and the
state. It defines the rights of its stockholders and is, therefore, in some respects a con-
tract between them individuals." Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del. Ch.
153, 158, 7 A.2d 753, 758 (1939).
33. Bylaws are rules a corporation adopts to govern its own management. These
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the rules and regulations for building operation and the tenant-share-
holders' rights.
35
Upon formation, the corporation acquires land and an apartment
building.3 6 Corporate loans secured by mortgages on the acquired land
and building provide financing for the acquisition.37 Once a building is
acquired, the corporation allocates stock to various apartments 38 in
amounts corresponding to their respective values. 39 Prospective pur-
chasers of individual units subscribe 4° to the corporation's capital
stock; each prospective purchaser, however, must also complete an in-
formation form before the sale is finalized.41 This form, along with
laws regulate the management of the corporation's affairs. See Bagley v. Reno Oil Co.,
201 Pa. 56, 57, 50 A.760, 761 (1902).
34. See Goldstein, Negotiating for a Cooperative Apartment, 1 REAL ESTATE RE-
VIEw 75, 76-77 (1972). The proprietary lease is defined as a "long term lease and not
any other kind of ownership document. It is a creature of lawyers' imagination. 'Pro-
prietary' is a descriptive term only, indicating that the tenant is also a shareholder." Id.
For a discussion of the differences between a proprietary lease and a regular lease, see P.
KEHOE, supra note 28, at 24.
35. See Note, Examining Cooperative Conversion: An Analysis of Recent New York
Legislation, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1091 (1983). For additional information on
corporate charters, bylaws and proprietary leases, see P. KEHOE, supra note 28, at 21-
24.
36. The landowner transfers to the corporation both deed to the land and title to the
building. Title to both, then, vests in the corporation. If no apartment building exists
on the land, the corporation must construct one. See supra text accompanying notes 25-
26.
37. Promoters of cooperating housing projects can utilize a number of methods to
finance initial purchase and construction. They can float bond issues, borrow capital
from institutional lenders, receive a purchase money mortgage from the seller or simul-
taneously sell the cooperative interests to tenant-shareholders. See P. ROHAN & M.
RESKIN, supra note 22, § 2.01, at 2.
38. Id. § 2.02[5], at 21. The board of directors determines the amount of shares to
which each apartment is entitled. The shares are important because they both give the
holder the right to a proprietary lease and determine the amount of the holder's
monthly assessment.
39. Note, supra note 7, at 1408. An apartment's value is determined by its size,
view, location and accessibility.
40. Before a prospective purchaser signs a binding purchase agreement, he "sub-
scribes" to buy cooperative stock. At this point he is called a subscriber. When he is
approved by the board and purchases the stock, he becomes a shareholder. See P.
ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 2.02[5], at 18. For an example of a subscription
agreement, see id., app. D-2, at 223.
41. The form requires a prospective purchaser to give references and information




subsequent interviews, is extremely important because it gives the co-
operative an opportunity to evaluate the prospective purchaser to de-
termine whether or not he is financially42 and socially43 suitable for the
community. If the cooperative approves the buyer, he enters into a
final agreement' for purchase of the stock shares allocated to his
apartment.45 In addition to allowing the tenant-shareholder to
purchase stock shares, the purchase agreement grants the buyer the
right to enter into a proprietary lease with the corporation.4 6 The lease
is the essential document of possession without which the buyer may
not occupy the apartment.4 7
Having acquired shares of stock and the proprietary lease, the ten-
ant-shareholder becomes obligated to pay a periodic assessment or
rent.4 8 This assessment constitutes the cooperator's pro rata share of
the project's blanket mortgage,49 interest,50 capital outlays5 ' and oper-
ating expenses. 52 The proprietary lease sets forth both the amount and
method of payment.5 3 The lease also includes "house rules" 54 defining
42. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
44. See P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 2.02[5], at 18-19. The purchase
agreement lists the number of shares to be sold, the sale price and the method of pay-
ment. See e.g., id., app. D-2, at 304-10.
45. The buyer is not purchasing an apartment. Rather, he is purchasing shares of
stock in the cooperative corporation, entitling him to lease the apartment.
46. See supra note 34.
47. Without a proprietary lease, the purchaser has no right to occupy an apartment.
Stock ownership, however, is nonetheless important because it gives the purchaser the
right to obtain the proprietary lease. See McCullough, supra note 16, at 315-16.
48. The term "rent" and "periodic assessment" both signify the amount of money a
tenant-shareholder must pay at various intervals. The only difference according to one
commentator, is that the term "rent" is considered a sign of inferior social status. See
Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987, 991
(1963).
49. See Note, supra note 7, at 1414. The mortgage reflects the amount of the out-
standing loan owed to the seller of the land and building.
50. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 773. It is worthwhile to note that the I.R.S. allows a
tenant-shareholder to deduct his interest payments on the cooperative's mortgage from
his income tax. See I.R.C. § 163 (1985).
51. See Note, supra note 5, at 547 (1947). Capital outlays cover such expenses as
the building's upkeep, repairs, security and general improvements. The board of direc-
tors is responsible for determining this amount.
52. Berger, supra note 48. at 991.
53. Some proprietary leases, however, simply leave open the amount of payment
due. When payment on the corporation's mortgage is required, each tenant-shareholder
19861
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the tenant-shareholder's rights and responsibilities within the coopera-
tive. In addition, both the lease and stock shares contain provisions
restricting the cooperator's right to alienate his interest." By entering
into the lease, the tenant shareholder implicitly agrees to comply with
these rules and restrictions. 6
B. The Need for Restrictions on the Transferability of the
Cooperative Apartment
All cooperative apartment corporations restrict transferability of
their dwelling units. 57  The restrictions provide tenant-shareholders
with a mechanism for exercising a degree of selectivity in choosing po-
tential cooperative members.58 Tenant-shareholder control over apart-
ment alienation is essential because of the financial interdependence
among tenant-shareholders and the proximity of the dwelling units.
1. Financial Interdependence
The cooperative corporation is subject to a blanket mortgage and a
single tax assessment.59 The cooperative's ability to make timely mort-
is assessed a pro-rata share based upon the amount of stock he holds. See P. ROHAN &
M. RasKIN, supra note 22, § 202[5], at 19-21.
54. See Rohan, Cooperative Housing: An Appraisal of Residential Controls and En-
forcement Procedures, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1323, 1324-25 (1965). These rules vary be-
tween cooperative projects. The board of directors is given the power to amend the
rules. House rules typically relate to such things as the tenant-shareholders' behavior,
music playing and dress in certain building areas. Id. at 1325.
55. See Whitebrook, The Cooperative Apartment, 9 PRAC. LAw 25, 28-29 (1963).
Depending upon how the promoter drafted a particular cooperative's documentation,
the restriction may appear solely in the lease or on the face of the stock. Most coopera-
tives, however, utilize both types of restrictions. See, e.g., Weisner v. 791 Park Ave.
Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
56. See Rohan, supra note 54, at 1325. Failure to abide by the house rules may
cause the tenant-shareholder to lose his cooperative interest. This occurs when the
board exercises the lease's forfeiture provisions. The board may choose instead, how-
ever, to file suit and seek injunctive relief.
57. See Isaacs, supra note 2, at 219. For a discussion of the different methods a
cooperative employs to restrict transferability of dwelling units, see infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
58. See Moller, The Condominium Confronts the Rule Against Perpetuities, 10
N.Y.L.F. 377, 383, 386 (1964).
59. Berger, supra note 48, at 993. This is one advantage to owning an interest in a
cooperative. Because the entity is liable for the mortgage and tax assessment, the indi-
vidual tenant-shareholders have limited liability upon default. Co-operators are
shielded from the risk of personal liability.
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gage payments depends upon each tenant-shareholder's making
prompt payment of his monthly assessment.' If one cooperator de-
faults on his obligation, the other shareholders must bear the defi-
ciency.6 If they fail to pay the difference, a foreclosure proceeding
may ensue, 62 resulting in the cooperators losing both their apart-
ments63 and their equity investments.' This financial interdependence
between tenant-shareholders necessitates that cooperatives have a
method to prevent individuals of limited financial means from acquir-
ing an interest in the project.65
2. Proximity of the Dwelling Units
In addition to insuring the cooperatives' financial stability, transfer
restrictions provide the means to exclude socially undesirable per-
sons.66 Unlike a conventional homeowner, a cooperative owner cannot
60. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
61. See P. ROHAN & M. RUSKIN, supra note 22, § 2.01[4], at 10. In this situation,
each remaining tenant-shareholder would pay part of the unpaid amount on the same
pro-rata basis that represents the tenant-shareholder's individual interest in the
corporation.
62. See, e.g., Prudence Co. v. 160 West Seventy-Third Street, 260 N.Y. 205, 183
N.E. 364 (1932). See also Note, supra note 7, at 1410-11. A foreclosure proceeding is
initiated by a debtor's failure to make good on his obligation. If the cooperative corpo-
ration fails to pay its debt, the creditor will foreclose on the mortgage he has on the land
and apartment. The property is then sold, usually in a judicial sale. The balance of the
loan is paid from the sale proceeds. For a detailed discussion of foreclosure proceed-
ings, see G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7,
at 424-523 (1979) [hereinafter cited as G. OSBORNE].
63. The cooperator will lose the right to occupy his apartment if he entered into the
lease after the mortgagee-the cooperative corporation-recorded the mortgage. If,
however, his lease began before the mortgage recording, then the cooperator has prior-
ity over the foreclosure sale buyer and may remain in his apartment until the lease
expires. G. OSBORNE, § 7.12, at 451-52.
64. If the foreclosure sale generates surplus capital, the excess may go to the cooper-
ators. If junior creditors have claims or if the sale fails to raise surplus capital, however,
the tenant-shareholders are not reimbursed for previously paid assessments. Id. § 7.31,
at 519-23.
65. This point cannot be understated. During the Depression years countless coop-
erative apartment buildings were lost to foreclosure proceedings. "All but two above
average-income apartment houses in New York were. . . 'wiped out' during the de-
pression." Hearings on Cooperative Housing Before the House Committee on Banking
and Currency, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1950); Berger, supra note 48, at 993 n.35.
66. Note, supra note 7, at 1416. What makes a prospective purchaser "undesirable"
depends upon the particular views of the cooperative or its board of directors. A pro-
spective purchaser's opinions, tastes or type of employment may be the deciding factor.
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isolate himself from his neighbors.67 Due to the dwelling units' prox-
imity,68 the joint use of common areas 69 and the inherent necessity for
collective action,70 a tenant-shareholder cannot avoid frequent contact
with his neighbors. In order to insure a certain degree of social har-
mony and agreeable management policies, cooperators must have com-
patible lifestyles.71 By restricting the transferability of a tenant-
shareholder's interest, 72 cooperatives can prevent disruptive individu-
als from obtaining the right to inhabit an apartment.
C. Transfer Restrictions in the Form of Board
of Director Consent Clauses
An important element, then, of a cooperative housing venture is the
ability of tenant-shareholders to select building occupants. 73 Lease re-
strictions on the right to assign an apartment 74 and transfer restrictions
on the sale of corporate stock75 enable cooperatives to determine who
shall occupy the dwelling units. Conditioning all sales and assignments
67. See Isaacs, supra note 2, at 218. "The homeowner can hide from his neighbors
. . . . He need have no personal contact with them . . . . The cooperative owner,
however, has no place to build a hedge." Id.
68. See supra note 4.
69. See Moller, supra note 58, at 383. Common areas include elevators, halls, swim-
ming pools, recreational facilities and laundry rooms.
70. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 774. Tenant-shareholders are called upon to choose
board members, vote on management proposals and decide whether to allow a particu-
lar purchaser to buy into the project.
71. One court has stated that this is the "only way to keep cooperative housing
cooperative." Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 89, 171
N.E.2d 30, 32 (1960).
72. Cooperatives may never prevent individuals from obtaining the right to occupy
an apartment based upon race, religion, creed or sex. For a discussion of this prohibi-
tion, see infra note 134. See also J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING (1983).
73. See Isaacs, supra note 2, at 219.
74. A typical lease restriction provision may read as follows:
The Lessee shall not assign this lease, or any interest therein, and no such assign-
ment shall take effect as against the Lessor for any purpose, unless and until all of
the following requirements have been complied with and satisfied:
4. A written consent to such assignment authorized by a resolution of the
board of directors. . .must be delivered to the Lessor.
Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corporation, 6 N.Y.2d 42, 46, 160 N.E.2d 720, 722, 190
N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (N.Y. 1959).
75. A typical bylaw transfer restriction may read as follows: "No share or shares of
the capital stock shall be sold, pledged, encumbered or otherwise disposed of without
the prior written consent of the board." See P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22,
app. D-2, at 203.
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of corporate stock on the prior consent of the cooperative's board of
directors is the most effective and most commonly employed tech-
76 Beaseeenique. Because elected tenant-shareholders comprise the board,77 ar-
guably they are the best qualified to determine whether a prospective
purchaser is financially and socially suited to the community. 78
III. ATTACKS ON TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS AND
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSES
Despite their importance to cooperators, transfer restrictions have
not gone unchallenged.7 9 Tenant-shareholders who unsuccessfully
have attempted to sell8' cooperative interests have challenged the va-
lidity of provisions conditioning sales and assignments of their interests
on the board of directors' consent. Judicial response to the attacks
clearly has favored upholding the restrictions."1 Some jurisdictions,
however, have acknowledged both the hardships that restrictions place
76. See Sanders v. Tropicana, 31 N.C.App. 276, 278, 229 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1976).
-[T]he restraint almost always takes the form of prohibiting transfers except with the
consent of the board of directors." Id. Cooperatives, however, employ a number of
other methods to restrain the transferability of a tenant-shareholder's proprietary lease
and stock shares. Among these methods are: (1) requiring the seller to return his inter-
est in exchange for his initial downpayment; (2) requiring the seller to give the corpora-
tion the right of first refusal for sale of the lease and stock, at a predetermined or book
value price; and (3) requiring the seller to allow the cooperative to meet the purchase
price. See Berger, supra note 48, at 1017. For a brief discussion of the advantages of
transfer restrictions, see Note, supra note 7, at 1418.
77. See supra note 7.
78. A cooperator usually resides in the community for a number of years before
being elected to a director position. This gives him an opportunity to become ac-
quainted with the other tenant-shareholders and gain a general "feel" of the commu-
nity's atmosphere, tastes, likes and dislikes. Even so, a director may be isolated from
the ideas of the cooperative community at large, or may base his views on those held by
his particular social group within the cooperative, rather than on the entire community.
79. See Note, supra note 7, at 1416. Due to time and expense constraints, and a
judicial bias in favor of transfer restrictions, there has not been an overwhelming
amount of litigation in this area. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
80. Prospective buyers also have brought suit when boards of directors have refused
consent to the proposed sale. See, e.g., Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. 648, 458 A.2d
355 (1983).
81. No court has yet declared a cooperative lease or transfer restriction void. See,
e.g., Gale v. New York Center Community Coop. Inc., 21 111. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30
(1960); 68 Beacon Street, Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935); Sanders v.
Tropicana, 31 N.C. App. 276, 229 S.E.2d 304 (1976).
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upon a cooperative-seller 2 and the possibility that the board may
abuse its power in withholding consent. As a result, these jurisdictions
have formulated and applied a standard that recognizes these concerns;
this standard balances the cooperative's needs against the tenant-share-
holder's right to sell his interest.8 3 Conversely, other courts disre-
garded a selling cooperator's interests 4 and looked solely to the
interests of the remaining tenant-shareholders. These courts give the
board of directors unlimited discretion to withhold consent to a sale.85
A. Attacking the Validity of Board Decisions to Withhold Consent
Cooperators opposing board decisions withholding consent have as-
serted three legal arguments. First, they contend that they have a real
property interest in the cooperative, and that restrictions limiting
transferability of this interest violate the rule against restraints on
alienation. Second, cooperators claim that restrictions on their stock
interests violate state corporate laws. Finally, cooperators allege that
transfer restrictions on their stock violate the rule against restraints on
alienation.
Because an interest in a cooperative corporation gives a tenant-
shareholder many attributes of fee simple ownership,8 6 cooperators
claim that they possess a real property interest.8 7 Because a general
82. These include the inability to liquidate his interest, change residence or change
employment.
83. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 782-83. The court's focus should be on the re-
straint's utility as compared to the injurious consequences that would flow inevitably if
the restraint were enforced. Gale, 21 Ill. 2d at 89, 171 N.E.2d at 33.
84. See, eg., Weisner, 6 N.Y.2d 426, 190 N.Y.S.2d 10, 160 N.E.2d 720.
85. See Whitebrook, supra note 55, at 29. By allowing the board of directors to
withhold consent to a sale, courts have avoided questions dealing with the legality of
withholding consent. The courts will not, however, rubber stamp a board refusal that is
based on the buyer's race, religion, creed and sex.
86. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. In some situations courts have in fact
held that a co-operative interest is an interest in real property. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 191, 22 P.2d 694, 697 (1933) (ownership of apartment constituted
an interest in real property for purposes of estate settlement); Estate of Rockwell, 26
Misc. 2d 709, 205 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (cooperative passes through will as real
property). But cf. Matter of Miller, 205 Misc. 770, 772, 130 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (Sup.
Ct. 1954) (holding that cooperative did not pass to beneficiary although will read "all
real estate owned by me"). See P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22, § 201[5], at 44.
See also Bratt, supra note 17, at 782-83.
87. See, e.g., Jones, 189 Conn. at 651, 458 A.2d at 357-58. Individuals making this
claim must first determine whether or not the jurisdiction characterizes a cooperative
interest as one in real property. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 784.
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rule"8 of real property states that an owner of an absolute estate enjoys
an "inherent right to alienate his fee," 8 9 cooperators argue that restric-
tions on the right to transfer cooperative interests are void.90 Courts
take two different approaches when confronted with the issue. Some
courts classify a cooperator's interest as a lease.91 Because restraints
on leasehold transferability are universally valid,92 this characteriza-
tion allows courts to uphold these restrictions. Other courts, however,
avoid labelling a cooperator's legal interest. By simply exempting co-
operative housing corporations from the rule against restraints on
alienation,93 these courts compare the policy behind the rule invalidat-
ing transfer restrictions 94 with the needs of cooperative projects95 and
conclude that the public policy favoring social and economic stability
88. See Comment, Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment Property, 13
HASTINGS L.J. 357, 362 (1961). A restraint on alienation is defined as:
[A] provision in an instrument of conveyance which prohibits the grantee from
selling or transferring the property which is the subject of the conveyance ....
Any provision in a trust or other instrument which, either by express terms or by
implication, purports to prohibit or penalize the use of the power of alienation
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (5th ed. 1979).
89. Note, Due-On-Sale Clauses: An Argument for Adopting the Majority Approach,
26 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 71, 73 (1984). Although courts disfavor restraints
on alienation, such restraints nevertheless are upheld if reasonable. See Tiffany, supra
note 1, at § 103. See also Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44
YALE L.J. 961 (1934-35). For a discussion of the rule against restraints on alienation's
history and application, see Comment, supra note 88, at 361.
90. See, e.g., Alexy v. Kennedy House, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 690, 700-01 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (tenant-shareholder claiming transfer restrictions allowing corporation to buy
back apartment at set price constituted illegal restraint on alienation).
91. See Jones, 189 Conn. at 650, 458 A.2d at 358. "For some purposes [a coopera-
tive owner] has legal title and an interest in real property, while for other purposes his
rights. . . resemble an interest in personal property," Id. At least one authority be-
lieves that because property rights are statutory creations, state legislatures should de-
termine the nature of cooperative interests. See P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22,
§ 201[5], at 14-15. See also Note, supra note 7, at 1417 n.60.
92. See I RASCH, LANDLORD AND TENANT 10 (Ist ed. 1950). Leasehold rights are
not subject to the rule against restraints on alienation. Id.
93. See Ross, Condominium in California-The Verge of an Era, 36 S. CAL. L.
REv. 351, 353 (1962). See, e.g., Penthouse Properties v.1158 Fifth Ave., 256 A.D. at
691-92, I1 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
94. A number of policy reasons underly the rule. These include the desire to avoid
concentration of wealth, restraints tending to prevent property improvement and avoid-
ance of the detrimental effects of keeping property out of commerce. See also Schnebly,
supra note 89, at 963-64.
95. See supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
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in cooperatives outweighs ritualistic invalidation of restraints on
alienation.
96
Tenant-shareholders claiming that state corporate laws make unlaw-
ful and void all restrictions on a shareholder's right to alienate his co-
operative stock do not enjoy the support of most 97 state statutes.98
Most state corporation statutes expressly endorse provisions that re-
strict a shareholder's right to transfer his shares. 99 Such restrictions
are permissible under the theory that a corporation may protect itself
from hostile and disinterested persons becoming part of manage-
ment.1°° Because cooperatives adopt transfer restrictions for reasons
similar to conventional business corporations, courts apply these gen-
eral corporation statutes to cooperative stock as well as corporate
stock.
Although courts readily discard complaints focusing on a coopera-
tive's legal interest and on state corporate statutes, judicial scrutiny
increases in most jurisdictions when a cooperator contends that stock
transfer restrictions constitute unlawful restraints on alienation. 101
A majority of jurisdictions do not allow a cooperative's board of di-
rectors full and arbitrary power to withhold consent to stock trans-
96. See Moller, supra note 58, at 386.
97. See, e.g., Beacon Street, Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 357, 194 N.E. 303, 306
(1935).
98. The tenant-shareholders' position is adopted by a few states. The statute of one
such state, New Hampshire, reads: "No corporation shall make any bylaw to restrain
the free sale of its stock; every such bylaw shall be void." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 296:14 (1977).
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, however, do not follow the New Hamp-
shire model. Even in those states that have not enacted a statute allowing bylaw trans-
fer restrictions, courts have upheld "reasonable restrictions." See 8 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 4205 (Perm. ed. 1932). For an example of a case adopt-
ing this position, see Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n., 482 S.W.2d 841 (1972)
(reasonable restriction on alienation of stock valid under Texas general corporate
statute).
99. A typical statute reads as follows: "[R]estrictions on the right to transfer shares
• . . shall be set forth on the certificate." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.25 (Page
1985).
100. See FLETCHER, supra note 98, § 5461, at 228-309.
101. See, eg., Beacon Street, Inc. v. Sohior, 284 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935)
(contending that transfer restrictions on back of stock constitute illegal restraint); Pent-
house Properties v. 1158 Fifth Ave., 256 A.D. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (contending that a
board of directors' refusal to transfer stock shares on corporation's books, pursuant to
transfer restriction, constituted illegal restraint).
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fers.' 0 2 These jurisdictions attempt to balance the cooperator's desire
to freely dispose of his property against the competing need of the co-
operative to protect its members' social and financial security.' °3 In so
doing, these courts neither declare consent clauses "automatically void
nor automatically valid."'"
This majority view generally upholds unequivocally stated consent
clauses if the clauses protect the cooperative's social and financial wel-
fare. ' To determine whether the board has acted reasonably in with-
holding consent,"0 6 these courts review, on a case by case basis, the
decisions made by a cooperative's board of directors. The Connecticut
Supreme Court adopted this position in Jones v. O'Connell. °7
In Jones, a cooperator in a six-unit cooperative apartment project
contracted to sell her stock shares to another tenant-shareholder,
Jones,' who owned the apartment directly below. Jones planned to
combine the apartments to provide additional living space for his fam-
ily. " Provisions in the proprietary leases and memoranda of offerings
conditioned the sale of each tenant-shareholder's stock on board ap-
102. See, e.g., Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135, 137 (7th Cir.
1967) (holding absolute control unjustified).
103. See id. at 137. "[T]he freedom of each member-tenant to dispose of his prop-
erty right should be afforded protection. . . .the power to withhold consent must be
exercised in the light of the purpose of the arrangement." Id. See also Bratt, supra note
17, at 785.
104. Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. at 654, 458 A.2d at 358. The courts employ a
balancing test. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
105. Jones, 189 Conn. at 654, 458 A.2d at 358. Restrictions must be stated clearly
and conspicuously. The failure to do so may prevent a restriction from binding a ten-
ant-shareholder for lack of notice, vagueness or the general inclination of courts to void
restraints on fee interests. "[T]he law does not favor. . . and will not recognize them
unless stated in unequivocal terms." Id. But see Sanders v. Tropicana, 31 N.C. App. at
284, 229 S.E.2d at 309 (restrictions must be stated clearly, but they do not have to
"detail every instance" when consent will be withheld).
106. See Comment, supra note 88 at 360-62. Courts apply a two-pronged test. The
first prong entails determining whether the transfer restriction was enacted to protect
the tenant-shareholder's social and financial interests. If a court determines that the
first prong is met, then it next must determine whether the board acted reasonably when
exercising the restriction. See, e.g., Mowatt, 385 F.2d 135.
107. 189 Conn. 648, 458 A.2d 355 (1983).
108. See id. at 651, 458 A.2d at 357. The contract also included assignment of the
seller's proprietary lease.
109. Id. The plaintiff remarried the year before and had two additional children
living with him. By purchasing the rights to occupy the apartment, the plaintiff planned
to house his larger family in the two separate apartments.
1986]
Washington University Open Scholarship
162 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 30:147
proval." ° After the board refused to approve the proposed sale, Jones
brought suit to enjoin its decision."1  Jones maintained that the board
unreasonably withheld consent to the sale." 2 He further alleged that
the stock restriction constituted an unlawful restraint on the alienation
of property. 113 Responding to Jones' allegations, the board of directors
justified its decision to withhold consent by asserting its desire to pro-
tect the other tenant-shareholders' interests in the cooperative." 14
The board claimed that the proposed sale would ruin the coopera-
tive's character. The board also maintained that Jones' intended use of
the apartments would interfere with the other cooperators' use of the
common stairway 1 5 and might depreciate the apartments' market
value.
The court accepted the board's rationale and upheld its decision." 16
The court based its holding on the fact that the cooperative enacted the
restrictions to protect the interests of its tenant-shareholders. 1 7 It
held that the board's decision was reasonable in light of the structural
problems associated with Jones' intended use of the apartments." 8
Although the court upheld the board's decision, its analysis illustrates
the majority view's willingness to review board decisions and prevent a
board from exercising unfettered discretion in withholding consent to
110. Id. The memorandum of offering and the proprietary lease contained different
standards governing a board of directors' withholding of consent to transfer of a tenant-
shareholder interest. The memorandum gave the board the power to reject individuals
of unsuitable "character and financial responsibility." Id. The proprietary lease, how-
ever, indicated that "consent. . . can be granted or withheld for 'any reason or for no
reason.'" Id. In light of its reluctance to enforce restraints on alienation, the court
concluded that "the limited clause in the memorandum of offering must prevail over the
unqualified consent clause in the proprietary lease." Id. at 655, 458 A.2d at 359.
111. Id. at 651-52, 458 A.2d at 356.
112. Id. at 652, 458 A.2d at 357.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 656, 458 A.2d at 359. The board of directors asserted that because the
two apartments were not connected and the only access between them was the common
stairway, a single family occupying both apartments would cause great inconvenience to
the other tenant-shareholders. Id.
115. This combined use of the two apartments would make the stairway a part of
the two affected apartments in such a way as to interfere with its common use by other
tenants, who had an interest in the preservation of the building as a cooperative with six
separate apartments. Id. at 657, 458 A.2d at 360.
116. Id. at 652, 458 A.2d at 356.




the sale of a cooperative apartment.' 1 9
Representing the opposing view, New York courts hold that, be-
cause of the special economic and social features unique to cooperative
ownership,12° transfer restrictions on cooperative stock do not violate
the rule against restraints on alienation.12' This position is based upon
the theory that a cooperative's members have an unconditional right to
select their neighbors.' 22 Not only do the courts uphold the restric-
tions but they also refuse to review board decisions denying consent, 12
3
regardless of how arbitrary or unreasonable denials may seem. 124
The New York rule originated in Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue
Corp. 125 In Weisner, a tenant-shareholder contracted to sell his coop-
erative interest. 126 The cooperative corporation's bylaws contained
transfer restrictions conditioning all sales or assignments of corporate
stock upon approval of the board of directors.1 27 After reviewing the
buyer's application, the board summarily refused to consent to the pro-
posed sale.128 Asserting that the board unjustly had withheld consent
because certain board members had a personal vendetta against him,'29
119. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
120. See Penthouse Properties, 265 A.D. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423, "We conclude
. that the special nature of the ownership of co-operative apartment houses ...
requires that they not be included in the general rule against restraint on the sale of
stock in corporations organized for profit." Id.
121. To date, only New York has adopted this approach. Cooperative apartments,
however, are spreading to other jurisdictions. Whether these jurisdictions will follow
the New York or the majority view remains to be seen.
122. See Weisner, 6 N.Y.2d at 434, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
"[There is no reason why the owners of a cooperative apartment house could not de-
cide . with whom they wish to share ... their home." Id.
123. Absent a claim of illegal discrimination these courts will dismiss the com-
plaints for failure to state a claim. See id. at 434, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at
76.
124. See Goldstone v. Constable, 84 A.D.2d 510, 511, 443 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381
(1981). "The directors of this cooperative housing corporation have the contractual and
inherent power to approve or disapprove the transfer of shares and the assignment of
proprietary leases." Id. See also 15a AM. JUR. 2d § 82 (1976). Individuals denied ad-
mittance because of owning animals or washing machines are examples of unreasonable
denials. See Rohan, supra note 55, at 1332.
125. 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
126. Id. at 430, 160 N.E.2d at 721-22, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
127. Id. at 431, 160 N.E.2d at 722, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
128. Id. at 433, 160 N.E.2d at 723, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
129. Weisner claimed that the cooperative corporation's treasurer and board mem-
bers harbored animosity towards his brother. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 7 A.D.
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Weisner sued the board of directors seeking specific performance of the
sales contract. 130 The New York Supreme Court, special term, dis-
missed the complaint by denying Weisner's motion for a temporary
injunction.13 1 On appeal the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Di-
vision, reversed the special term court, granting buyer's claim for spe-
cific performance. 132 Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the appellate division's decision,133concluding that absent a
claim of discrimination based upon race, religion or sex, "there was no
reason why the owners of a cooperative could not decide for themselves
with whom they wished to live." 134
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK AND MAJORITY POSITIONS
AND AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
A. The New York View
Courts adhering to the New York rule accomplish their goal of pro-
tecting cooperators from potential financial or socially disruptive influ-
ences. By refusing to review board decisions denying prospective
purchasers admittance into the cooperative, these courts give coopera-
tive owners a unique opportunity to construct and preserve a commu-
75, 78, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (1958), rev'd, 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959). See also Note, Cooperative Apartments-A Legal Hybrid, 13 U.
FLA. L. RaV. 123, 130 (1960).
130. Weisner, 7 A.D.2d at 78, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
131. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 177 N.Y.S.2d 887, rev'd, 7 A.D. 75, 180
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1958), rev'd, 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
132. Weisner, 7 A.D.2d at 83, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 742 (appellate division held that
consent cannot be denied arbitrarily).
133. 6 N.Y.2d at 434, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75. The New York
Court of Appeals stated:
The statute which prohibits discrimination in cooperative because of race, color,
religion, national origin or ancestry is not involved in this case. Absent the appli-
cation of these statutory standards, and under the terms of the agreement between
plaintiff and Gilbert, there is no reason why the owners of the co-operative apart-
ment house could not decide for themselves with whom they wish to share their
elevators, their common halls and facilities, their stockholders' meetings, their
management problems and responsibilities and their homes.
Id.
134. The Fair Housing Act makes it "unlawful to refuse to sell . . . or make un-
available or deny, a dwelling because of race, religion, sex or national origin." Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)(1962). State legislators have
also enacted civil rights laws making housing discrimination illegal. See, e.g., N.Y.
Cry. RIGHTS LAW § 19-a(1) (McKinney 1976). See also P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN,
supra note 22, § 7.02[2][a].
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nity of individuals with similar tastes, ideals, and standards of living.
Despite these benefits, the New York approach fails as a model posi-
tion for several reasons. First, permitting a board of directors to exer-
cise absolute unreviewable discretion, provides cooperatives with the
means to practice unlawful discrimination." 5 New York's minority
approach enables a board of directors to conceal discrimination based
on race, religion and national origin' 3 6 when considering prospective
buyers, even though the courts would invalidate such discrimination if
evident. A board's ability to invent justifications for labeling a buyer
"undesirable," when combined with the minority view's unyielding
deference to board decisions, effectively shields a cooperative practicing
discrimination. The difficulty and expense inherent in pursuing such
allegations in court may further discourage attempts to challenge
board denials.' 37
Another problem with the New York approach is that, by providing
boards of directors with such broad powers, courts supply a method by
which cooperatives can "lock" tenant-shareholders into the project.
Because courts allow a board to arbitrarily and unreasonably.38 reject
any sale, a cooperator often lacks legal recourse to liquidate his invest-
ment. For many shareholders, the inability to sell makes it impossible
to relocate or to accept an employment transfer. Taken to the extreme,
refusing to approve a sale could force a cooperator into insolvency.'3 9
The inequity of these problems is magnified in cases where a board
withholds consent to economically sound purchasers solely because
they fail to meet particular social standards.
A final flaw in the New York approach is the possibility that the rule
prevents financially able persons from acquiring quality housing. Pub-
lic policy dictates that when housing is available, individuals of suffi-
135. See, e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc. 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
136. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
"[C]Iever men may easily conceal their motivations." Id. at 1186.
137. Aside from the enormous legal expenses litigation would cause, the potential
litigant also must consider practical matters. If preliminary injunctive relief is denied,
the rejected purchaser must find substitute housing. If the suit eventually is tried suc-
cessfully, the plaintiff must ask himself whether it is worth moving again and whether
he wants to live in a cooperative whose members are hostile to him.
138. See supra note 120-24 and accompanying text.
139. For example, if a tenant-shareholder has outstanding debts, he might choose to
sell his apartment. In such a situation, the board of directors' refusal to consent to the
proposed sale may lead the cooperator to declare bankruptcy. This result would also
hurt the other cooperators who would have to assume the bankrupt cooperator's
payments.
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cient financial means should not be denied access merely because they
fail to meet certain social standards.140 Adherence to this policy is es-
pecially appropriate in urban areas where shortages of quality housing
are common.141 Individuals denied access to cooperatives are forced to
compromise their living expectations by residing in less desirable areas,
or by residing in the suburbs and commuting. While these hardships
are often inescapable when housing is unavailable, it is unjust to force
them upon individuals capable of affording a cooperative apartment.
Thus, while the New York approach may serve a useful purpose, the
undue hardships caused by its overly broad and mechanical application
far outweigh its usefulness.
B. The Majority
In contrast to the New York approach, the majority approach pre-
serves the cooperative's social and financial integrity and, at the same
time, protects the tenant-shareholders' rights to liquidate their inter-
ests.142 The majority deviates from the New York approach in that it
believes that cooperators have the right to alienate their cooperative
interests provided that the consequences are not detrimental to other
cooperators. The majority standard for determining whether or not a
board has acted unlawfully prevents unjust or arbitrary denials of con-
sent. Concurrently, the standard protects the remaining tenant-share-
holders by leaving intact the board's power to reject risky purchasers.
The majority view further safeguards tenant-shareholders' interests by
placing the burden upon the board to show that its decision is reason-
able. This procedural difference limits the likelihood that the board
will deny a cooperator the full value of his investments while leaving
the board sufficient discretion to enable it to adequately protect the
remaining tenant-shareholders.
In addition to being more equitable, the majority position also serves
the public welfare. By guaranteeing the right to sell a cooperative in-
140. See Rohan, supra note 54, at 1332. "[]here benefit to the group interest al-
legedly served is remote and speculative and harm to the individual is real and immedi-
ate. . . the cooperative may best be served by holding the regulation unreasonable."
Id.
141. High rents and limited space characterize the housing market in city areas.
Purchasing a cooperative apartment rather than paying high rents thus makes practical
sense. If the cooperative assessment and the apartment rent are similar, a buyer who
purchases a cooperative builds up an equity investment and has the additional advan-
tage of deducting his mortgage interest payments.
142. See supra note 103.
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vestment, the majority makes cooperatives an attractive form of home
ownership. As the demand for cooperative apartments increases, de-
velopers convert more buildings from rental units to cooperatives. Be-
cause the cooperative apartment is a tenant-shareholder's home as well
as an investment, he invests more capital into its renovation and up-
keep. This will result in the improvement and regeneration of urban
neighborhoods.' 43 Such development will inevitably cause a general
increase in the quality of city life.
Practical problems, however, arise in the application of the majority
approach. By merely placing a reasonableness standard upon board
decisions, the majority gives boards of directors and selling cooperators
little guidance for determining what factors a board may properly con-
sider. Furthermore, reasonableness standards may vary from one juris-
diction to the next. For example, one court has held that the extensive
use of stairs by a family is a reasonable justification for the board to
withhold consent. " The same reason in another jurisdiction, how-
ever, may be unsatisfactory. The absence of a clear and uniform stan-
dard of review has compelled litigators to bring suits on an ad hoc
basis. These ad hoc suits are both costly and inefficient.' 45
While the majority approach limits the board of directors' power to
prevent tenant-shareholders from selling their stock, two factors sug-
gest that the approach does not go far enough. First, the shortage of
quality city housing and the interrelated financial interests of tenant-
shareholders warrant that cooperatives admit persons of sufficient fi-
nancial ability. A public policy of ensuring individuals access to hous-
ing within their means arguably is preferable to a policy of permitting
cooperatives to restrict entry only to individuals meeting certain social
criteria.
Second, it is questionable whether as a matter of policy, courts
143. See U.S. DEPT. OF H.U.D., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CON-
DOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 231 (1980) ("Policy favoring cooperative ownership
as a means of upgrading urban housing."); P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 22,
§ 201[5], at 19. If a restriction prohibits a cooperator from selling his interest without
first obtaining the board of directors' prior consent, the board retains an "absolute re-
straint." These restraints "prevent improvement upon land, because landowners are
reluctant to make improvements on property they cannot sell. Therefore, the restraint
retards the development of the community." Schnebly, supra note 89, at 964.
144. Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. 548, 458 A.2d 355 (1983). See also supra notes
114-15 and accompanying text.
145. See Note, supra note 89, at 97. Attorney fees are expensive, court dockets are
crowded, and the chances of successful litigation are doubtful. See also supra note 137.
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should ever allow a cooperative to reject a prospective purchaser based
upon social considerations. A free society should neither encourage
nor enhance a group's effort to maintain "pure" communities, when a
consequence of that effort is to prevent some individuals from ob-
taining the housing of their choice and prevent others from selling a
dwelling they no longer desire to keep. Even in light of this well-rea-
soned argument, however, majority courts continue to uphold board
decisions to withhold consent. 146
C. An Alternative Proposal
As the preceding discussion indicates, both the New York and ma-
jority positions present problems. An analysis of the two reveals that a
tenant-shareholder's right to liquidate his cooperative interest requires
more attention and protection. Because of the political strength of co-
operative housing groups and the internal nature of membership re-
strictions, it is doubtful whether state legislature will address these
concerns.147 The responsibility to vindicate cooperators' rights, there-
fore, lies with the judiciary.
Courts can provide protection for both the tenant-shareholder and
the remaining cooperators by limiting a board's power to withhold
consent 148 to those cases in which the purchasers financial stability is
in question. This insures a cooperator's ability to liquidate his invest-
ment while protecting the remaining tenant-shareholders from finan-
cial ruin.149 This standard denies cooperatives the power to reject a
146. See Rohan, supra note 54, at 1326. "[T]he board can make, interpret, and
selectively enforce restrictions with little danger of being reversed by the courts." Id.
147. State legislators have been extremely reluctant to pass cooperative legislation.
"As early as 1928 the call for legislative clarification of co-operators' rights went out"
but has since received little response. P. ROHAN & M. REsKiN, supra note 22,
§ 2.01[5], at 15.
148. One expert is of the opinion that if accepting a particular purchaser would
cause a great hardship on the other tenant-shareholders, the board of directors should,
after a proper hearing, have the power to reject him. Such a situation arose when for-
mer President Richard M. Nixon attempted to purchase a cooperative in New York
City. He made it clear, however, that precautions such as television monitors, elevator
guards and body searches of all individuals entering the cooperative would be necessary.
The board refused to consent to the sale and Nixon brought suit. The suit eventually
was dropped. Interview with John N. Drobak, Professor of Law, Washington Univer-
sity School of Law, in St. Louis, Missouri (Feb. 2, 1985).
149. Financially risky purchasers always can be rejected by a board of directors.
The board of directors should not, however, be the financial judge. This decision should
be made by an independent accounting firm, approved by both parties, which is given
the necessary statements and figures. This approach insures an objective analysis.
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buyer based upon arbitrary social considerations. To protect the re-
maining tenant-shareholders' social concerns and prevent them from
being laden with disruptive and inconsiderate purchasers, however, co-
operatives should insert into the project's bylaws strict house rules.
The cooperative then can condition a purchaser's continued right of
occupancy upon compliance with the rules. 150 Because courts will en-
force house rules,15' cooperatives, through precise drafting, can main-
tain harmonious communities.
Cooperatives should, however, be wary of board members unjustly
exercising these forfeiture provisions for violations of the house
rules.' 52 To guard against such abuse and curtail legal expenses, coop-
eratives can insert arbitration clauses into their documentation. These
clauses would require cooperatives and tenant-shareholders to submit
disputes to an independent arbitration committee instead of filing
suit.153 Arbitration would benefit the cooperative by reducing litiga-
tion costs. Additionally, arbitration benefits tenant-shareholders by
providing them with an independent forum to have their grievances
heard.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cooperative's need to restrict dwelling unit transferability can-
not be understated. Without this ability a major and important source
of modern day housing would perish. Similarly, an individual's ability
to liquidate his cooperative interest is an important right that deserves
protection. In the future, courts called upon to determine the validity
of stock transfer restrictions should adopt a more practical approach,
recognizing both the needs of selling cooperators and the remaining
tenant-shareholders. By limiting the reasons for which a board of di-
rectors can reject a sale, the courts can provide cooperators with a
greater opportunity to sell their cooperative interests. Furthermore,
cooperatives can still protect remaining tenant-shareholders from in-
150. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
151. See Rohan, supra note 54, at 1335. "Where public policy is not contravened
a promoter may insert the most restrictive house rules imaginable in a project's
documentation." Id.
152. See Note, supra note 5, at 608-10. Because a board can adopt and interpret
house rules and forfeiture provisions, it has the power to "target" a particular co-opera-
tor for unjust eviction. The courts should, therefore, be wary of cooperatives unjustly
exercising forefeiture provisions for house rules violations.
153. The arbitrator can be a member of an arbitration association or may be an
appointed arbitrator, such as a law professor.
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corrigible purchasers by conditioning the purchaser's right of occu-
pancy upon stringent house rules.
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